Ich, Selbstbewusstsein und der psychologische Paralogismus. Zur möglichen Bestimmung reflexiver Subjektivität und zur unmöglichen Bestimmung einer Ich-Substanz bei Kant.
In: Kant-Studien, Jg. 109 (2018-06-01), Heft 2, S. 228-248
academicJournal
Zugriff:
This article addresses the fact of possible and impossible determination of the I or the self-reflective I. In this context, two questions in particular are discussed: What epistemic functions of the I can be legitimately identified, and what kinds of determination of the I are invalid? A theoretical proof of the immortality of a single, persistent substance of the soul (anima) is not possible, because no material substance that corresponds to the I can be found or determined. As this article shows, however, at least a specific form of knowledge of the I, with a view to Kant’s unity of apperception and its actions, can be observed and is therefore epistemically justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Titel: |
Ich, Selbstbewusstsein und der psychologische Paralogismus. Zur möglichen Bestimmung reflexiver Subjektivität und zur unmöglichen Bestimmung einer Ich-Substanz bei Kant.
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Olk, Carsten |
Zeitschrift: | Kant-Studien, Jg. 109 (2018-06-01), Heft 2, S. 228-248 |
Veröffentlichung: | 2018 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0022-8877 (print) |
DOI: | 10.1515/kant-2018-0007 |
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